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We establish the importance of government corruption and youth literacy for their effects on
Youth Reproductive Health (YRH), with particularly strong effects on adolescent girls, in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). We identify the magnitude of these previously unspeciﬁed factors in
the reproductive health of young people by controlling for the commonly cited inﬂuences of
poverty and social inequality. We also measure the policy-mediated effects of ethnic diversity
on women’s ages at marriage, the marriage age-gap, the age at ﬁrst sexual encounter, and the
prevalence of sexual encounters before age 15. Our analysis highlights the interplay of these
factors in a region where there is high risk for sexually-transmitted diseases (STD). We account
for the possible endogeneity of youth literacy when used as a predictor of YRH. Our cross-
country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions show that
corruption, ethnic fractionalization and youth literacy are powerful predictors of YRH.
Key Words: Reproductive health, early marriage, corruption, ethnic diversity, cross-generation
intimate relations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I18, I31, J13.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
A series of recent events in and outside of Africa suggest that the youth in this region is at the
dawn of a new era of hope. On one hand, Africa’s leaders have recently pledged to initiate a
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1youth-centered development strategy that could bring substantial improvements to the youth’s liv-
ing conditions, which are arguably among the worse in the world. A notable event in that respect is
the adoption of the African Youth Charter (AYC) by the African Union1, which has also declared
2009-2019, the Decade on Youth Development.2 The declaration includes among the priority is-
sues that need to be addressed for the empowerment of African youth, “education, employment,
safe spaces for recreation and leisure, participation in policy-making processes at national, regional
and continental levels, and health issues.” Moreover, the preamble of the AYC assesses the “inter-
relatedness” of the challenges facing youth and calls for cross-sectoral policies and programs to
address the needs of youth. On the other hand, The World Bank, calling on African countries to
adopt active policies aimed at increasing the youth employment and addressing the challenge it is
facing, advocated for “comprehensive” and “multiple service” approaches.3 The Bank also identi-
ﬁed youth employment as a key to poverty Reduction and conﬂict Prevention.
Focussing on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this paper’s main message is that the new era of
hope for the youth will not bring the expected positive changes unless it also is a new era in
accountability and performance of African states in their mission to design and implement appro-
priate policies. It tresses the necessity to substantiate these good intentions with sound policies,
by encouraging an active involvement of civil societies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO),
donors, as well as policy-oriented research institutions in the transformation process. In doing so,
the paper chooses to focus on youth reproductive health (YRH) as the organizing subject of the
discussion. YRH indeed is not only a gateway to a broader view of the youth burden in Africa,
but also a domain of public health that needs the most urgent attention, in an era when Africa is
struggling against the devastating economic and social consequences of HIV/AIDS.
1.2 Governance, Culture, and youth literacy as explanatory variables for
YRH
Available data on early sexual intercourse suggest that this phenomenon is more prevalent among
theyouthinSSAthaninotherregionsoftheworld(Wellingsetal. 2006). Onemustreadthesedata
with great caution because they are subject to diverse errors and biases.4 Early sexual intercourse
is known to be associated with a higher number of lifetime sexual partners. One consequence is
a higher risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections (Genuis and Genuis 2004). Therefore,
this behavior poses a serious public health issue, which needs to be addressed. Studies show that
sexual abuse, especially that directed against girls, is a major factor in early sexual intercourse
(Moore et al. 2007, Shanler and Stewart 1998).
In this paper, we consider the cross-country variation in early sexual debut and early marriage
in SSA. And we explore the extent to which a set of factors account for these variations as follows.
1In Banjul, The Gambia, July 2, 2006
2Addis Ababa, 23 February 2009.
3World Bank, African Development Indicators (ADI) 2008/09
4We suspect that the self-report will be somewhat inﬂuenced by notions of morally acceptable and unacceptable
behavior in the societies where the data is collected. Men tend to over-report their sexual experiences while women
tend to underreport theirs (Wellings et al. 2006). However, we use sexual behavior data from nationally representative
surveys.
2Studies of education and health outcomes often evoke three of these factors: poverty, gender in-
equality, and youth illiteracy (Lloyd 2007). To the best of our knowledge, earlier studies of youth
reproductive health have not considered two other factors, governance and ethnic diversity. Gov-
ernance is measured in this paper by “corruption,” understood here as the abuse of public power
for private beneﬁts (Tang 1998). In section 2, we present the motivations for the consideration of
these two factors. To gauge the conditional effects of each of these factors in the presence of the
others, we perform OLS and IV estimations of several regression models. In each of these models,
the dependent variable is one of a set of indicators that capture different aspects of YRH. These
variables are: female median age at marriage, the average age-difference between men and women
in married couples, the proportion of women who marry before the age of 15 years, the median
age at ﬁrst sexual intercourse for boys and girls, and the proportion of boys and girls who engage
in sexual activities before the age of 15 years.
On the side of the regressors, we measure poverty by the percentage of a population living
on less than $2 per day (moderate poverty).5 We measure inequality by the Gini Index. We use
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI) as our measure of corruption.
We use ethnic fractionalization to measure politically relevant ethnic rivalry. Gender inequality is
measured by the number of literate girls per 100 literate boys. In alternative regressions, female
and male youth literacy are considered separately.6 Our main objective is to provide a discussion
and a quantitative analysis in which the interplay between gendered poverty, gender inequality,
ethnic diversity, globalization, and governance, is considered along with its impact on YRH.
We ﬁnd that traditional factors such as poverty,inequality and gender inequality, as well
as youth literacy, do explain the variations on women’s age at marriage, early marriage, the
male/female marriage age-gap, and the age at ﬁrst sexual intercourse. account for the gender
Our ﬁndings are interesting for several reasons. Indeed, while poverty and inequality are gen-
erally viewed as the main predictors of youth reproductive health in developing countries, we ﬁnd
that cross-country variations in corruption, ethnic fractionalization and youth literacy do explain
the observed variations in YRH better than do poverty and inequality. If the effect of youth liter-
acy on YRH is arguably not so surprising, corruption and ethnic fractionalization can be viewed
as hidden factors of YRH, which deserve more attention from national and international health
institutions. In the light of the arguments presented in the next section, the policy implication of
our ﬁnding is multifold. Foremost among its other effects, corruption, like poverty, needs to be ad-
dressed as a public health issue issue that may have a particularly strong impact on the reproductive
health of young women. This important effect is too often missing from policies focused on health
issues in developing countries. In SSA, corruption may well be an instrumental cause of many
health-related issues that are more commonly treated as consequences of poverty and inequality.
More empirical studies are necessary, however, to unveil all possible links between corruption and
its ill-effects on the health of the populations in SSA. Second, policymakers should take seriously
the possibility that politically potent ethnic rivalries in SSA can hinder public health activities
and programs. In acknowledging this possibility, reproductive health organizations need to work
with ethnic and political conﬂict resolution committees. These two groupings of problem-solvers
5We also explore later the effect of extreme poverty to check the robustness of our ﬁndings.
6We also considered including the population among the regressors but abandoned that option because population
is endogenous to the sexual behaviors of its members. This is the case because these behaviors directly affect fertility.
Moreover, the addition of population as a regressor did not make a substantial difference in our ﬁndings.
3need to ﬁnd common ground for the protection of youth reproductive health. It is clear that these
political rivalries create obstacles in this domain.
Finally, education’s potential for empowering youth with the knowledge to self-manage re-
productive health cannot be over-emphasized. Unfortunately, government’s responsibility for pub-
lic education does not escape the corrosive effects of public corruption. In highlighting the chain
of effects from unaccountable governance to the depletion of resources needed to provide young
people with an adequate education, our study may point to the reality that no social issue can be
analyzed without recognizing the overall inﬂuence of pervasive public corruption. In SSA, corrupt
governance is a missing link between poverty and many social issues, including YRH. In our view,
recognizing that link would represent an indispensable step toward more effective and durable
solutions in many areas of social policy development.
In Section 2, we provide a more extensive discussion of Eorruption, Ethnic Diversity, and
Youth Literacy as predictors of YRH. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents estimation
results. Section 5 offers our conclusions.
2 Corruption, Ethnic Diversity, and Youth Literacy as predic-
tors of YRH
2.1 Poverty, Corruption, and Youth Reproductive Health
Poverty and inequality, more precisely gender inequality, are generally taken to be key factors
in early marriage because for many poor parents, sending daughters into marriage at an early
age represents a beneﬁcial alternative to the costs of schooling a child (Nour 2006). However,
empirical works have found uncertain linkage between poverty and youth sexual behavior (Madise
et al. 2007).7
Eradication of poverty is the ﬁrst of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals.
However, can this goal be achieved if country governance represents a compelling part of the
problem of poverty while also posing as the instrument of its solution? Empirical studies ﬁnd that
corruption reduces government spending on both education and health (Mauro 1998). At a more
general level, corruption generates or increases income inequality and poverty because it distorts
a nation’s economic and social development (Tanzi 1998, Gupta et al 1998; World Bank 2000,
Ellis 2001). One can conclude that these effects of corruption contribute to economic and social
pre-conditions that increase risks to the physical wellbeing and reproductive health of adolescents,
particularly girls. In fact, there is evidence that poverty also increases corruption, making the
causal link between these two phenomena bidirectional (Treisman 2000, 2007). We note that SSA
is one of the most corrupt regions in the world.
7Madise et al. (2007) report, however, that poorer women face higher risk of Sexually-Transmitted Disease (STD)
related to early sexual debut and non-use of condoms.
42.2 Global Consumerism and the “Sugar-Daddy” Impact on YRH
A plausible narrative for the effect of corruption on YRH is the increased likelihood of cross-
generational sexual relationships and marriages, especially in cities. Note that social norms in SSA
increasingly tolerate cross-generational sexual intimacy in the form of so-called “Sugar Daddy”
relationships (Weisman et al. 2006, Luke and Kurtz 2002).
Where there is large-scale corruption, this “Sugar Daddy” phenomenon can become more
frequent. Two situations affect this scale of occurrence in SSA. As one inﬂuence, corruption often
festers within regimes of non-accountability, which characterize failed states. As major employers,
these states distribute rent-seeking positions in exchange for political and social support. The
entitlement of citizens to paid employment in the public sector depends less on qualiﬁcation and
education than on membership in rent-relevant entities, such as families, ethnic groups, religious
confessions, or political parties. So, in conjunction with the poor quality of public education, from
which government corruption diverts funding, the situation of generalized clientelism created by
corruption affects the outlook of youth in a profound way: it signals the irrelevance of education
as a worthwhile road to achievement. Indeed, there is mounting unemployment among educated
young men and women in SSA. SSA has in fact recently been singled out as the world region
where in some some countries, “secondary and tertiary education are not associated with lower
unemployment rate among the youth.” (Garcia and Fares 2008). A 2001 labor market study
conducted in the Republic of the Congo also found that 17 percent of the unemployed had achieved
educations at the upper secondary to university levels. Half of these individuals, 8.3% of the
unemployed, held university degrees.8
As a second powerful inﬂuence on these poorly governed societies, globalization produces a
demonstrable rush to obtain luxury goods, as its ideology of consumerism shapes the aspirations
of young men and women around the world and, in particular, in SSA (Nkosana 2006, Weisman
et al 2006). In the shadow of these inﬂuences, from the perspectives of impoverished parents and
their children, education appears to offer no viable road to a better life. As a consequence, in their
desire to secure materially better lives, poor young men and women become “easy prey” for much
older, relatively wealthy yet unscrupulous persons. The development of sex tourism in Gambia
provides an example of how corrupt governance translates directly into a state’s failure to protect
its youth from sexual abuse (UNICEF 2003).
Moreover, in the presence of endemic sexually-transmitted diseases (STD), the “Sugar
Daddy” phenomenon becomes more dramatic and frequent. Several studies report that older men
in SSA target younger women because they are less likely to have STD (Weisman et al. 2006,
Luke and Kurtz 2002). While poverty causes young men without resources to delay marriage,
parents without wealth may encourage their daughters to seize the earliest opportunity to marry
much older men in order to avoid pregnancies outside of marriage (UNICEF 2001). These factors
underscore the need for studies of the links between corruption and YRH.
8n fact, the ﬁgure of 8.3 percent was suspected to be lower than the actual ﬁgure because highly educated, un-
employed individuals tend to underreport their unemployment status (Libali 2006). The 17 percent of individuals
identiﬁed in the survey as having advanced educational status had been unemployed for an average of 4 to 6 years.
More than half of this group had never been employed.
52.3 Ethnic Diversity and YRH
To the extent that they become politically relevant, regional and local cultural differences can
also decrease the feasibility of nationally consistent reproductive health policies, in particular for
youth. This hypothesis develops from ﬁndings that social divisions negatively impact the ability
of governments to implement economically sound social policies (Easterly 2002). For example in
Nigeria, early marriage is more prevalent in Northern states than in the Southern states. However,
the incidence of premarital sexual activity is lower in the North than in the South (Makinwa-
Adebusoye 2006). These differences are due in part to cultural practices.9 They are also due to
cultural inertia and resistance. For example, legislation that sets the minimum age for marriage was
widely inconsistent in early 2000. While in the Northern States the age was 14 years or sometime
between the second and the third menstruation, it varied from 16 to 18 years in the Southern states
(OMCT 2005).
Another example of the negative effects of ethnic rivalries on reproductive health, in particu-
lar of the youth, is the situation prevailing in Southern Sudan, where early and forced marriage, as
well as teen pregnancy and sexual violence, co-exist with relatively high maternal mortality rates
(Aquilina et al. 2006). Adding to this picture, some empirical studies report that ethnic diversity
has a negative effect on public expenditures for health (Kuijs 2000).
In general, the subject of adolescent sexuality generates controversies in many parts of the
world. In SSA, we hypothesize that ethnic diversity will hinder the search for national consensus
on appropriate policies. As a consequence, ethnic diversity will have a negative impact on YRH.
2.4 Youth Literacy and Simultaneity Problems
Evoking female youth literacy as a factor in YRH requires some caution because, as discussed
earlier, schooling is an alternative to early marriage. Hence, other factors appear to determine
these two outcomes simultaneously. Thus, the argument that youth literacy determines YRH may
be viewed as circular. However, success stories, such as the Uganda AIDS prevention program,
the so-called A, B, and C, demonstrate that health education programs empower youth to make
important positive choices to protect their health (Blum 2004).10 The potential circularity of this
relationship raises the traditional endogeneity problem, which we address by using instrumental
variable regression techniques.
Another methodological problem arises in the era of HIV/AIDS. Is it possible that disease
awarenessandinternationalagreementsonyouthprotectionmediatetherelationshipbetweenYRH
and the diverse factors we consider in this paper? As much as possible, the researcher should “net
away” the fact that the members of the study population behave with awareness of the risks of
sexually-transmitted diseases. Otherwise, if not impossible, it is difﬁcult to distinguish the effects
of the factors that we consider from the speciﬁc effects of disease awareness. To resolve this
identiﬁcation problem, we use country-level data on youth which have the characteristic that the
underlying population samples include only persons born between 1965 and 1969. As a result, the
9The North is linguistically and religiously more homogenous than the South. Recall that Nigeria is a federation
of States.
10The abbreviated title of the program stands for “Abstinence, Be Faithful, and Use Condoms”.
6oldest members of these samples were 15 years old in 1984.11 These data thus pertain to youth in
SSA whose sexual behavior was relatively free of the fear of AIDS at the time of the sample.
Another question could be raised about the policy-mediating role of International child-
protection laws. These laws may force countries, regardless of how corrupt they are, to take
measures to protect children against the risks of early-age marriage. However, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, which deﬁned children as persons less than 18 years in age, became
international law in 1989 (UNHCHR 1989). This law would not have protected the population
sampled for our data.12
Note that a more general simultaneity problem may also be raised about corruption, poverty,
inequality, and what we describe here as the social or public-health consequences of these factors
for youth. Indeed, all these consequences may be simultaneously determined by other unknown,
unobservable, or unquantiﬁable factors. A country may have a particular social and political his-
tory that shaped social norms and behaviors, as well as long-lasting corruption-induced political
rivalries. For example, although South Africa plays no role in our study because of its lack of data
for the age groups and period that we study, its history may help to illustrate our point. During
the apartheid-era years of 1977-1981, the white-minority government of South Africa unilater-
ally declared the independence of the Transkei homeland, which incorporated Bophuthatswana,
Venda and Ciskei. This decision allowed tourism developers and homeland governments to build
a large casino business. The new market was satisfying a demand for tourist products and was
placing products and pursuits declared illegal in the South-African Republic within the reach of
South Africa’s white middle class (Thimothy 2001).13 Such historical events have possibly cre-
ated long-lasting motivations for corruption-related activities, such as money laundering, and other
post-apartheid social inequalities found today in the former Bantustans (Seekings 2007). More-
over, expansion of casino businesses and gaming may have likewise generated local conditions
conducive to youth delinquency (Laniel 2002, Timothy 2001). We do not address this more gen-
eral endogeneity problem in this paper. As a consequence, our conclusions should be taken with
this note of caution.
3 Data Description
Our data set includes the 48 SSA countries listed in the Appendix. The data were collected from
several sources. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) data are published by Transparency In-
ternational, an international organization engaged in the global ﬁght against corruption. These
indexes and the corresponding ranking of countries are available on the organization’s website.14
The information on youth sexual behavior and reproductive health was obtained from the Table 2
11The youngest members of the sample were 15 in 1980. AIDS became known by scientists in the early 1980’s.
However, the SSA population remained largely unaware of the devastating power of the disease during that period. The
seminal paper which established the link between the virus now known as HIV and AIDS was published no earlier
than 1984. Even then, in developed countries, the public became aware of the disease ﬁrst as a gay disease (Fauci
2003), and did not associate its occurrence with heterosexual intimacy.
12Most SSA countries did sign the convention.
13For example, interracial sex was illegal in South-Africa even while it was also an affordable-“product” in Bo-
phuthatswana. One year after its creation, this Bantustan attracted more than one million visitors (Timothy 2001).
14www.transparency.org
7of the article “Sexual behaviour in context: a global perspective,” published in Lancet (Wellings
et al. 2006). The marriage age-gap data are published by the United Nations Population Division
(UnitedNations2000). EthnicfractionalizationdatawereobtainedfromPosner(2004). Thesedata
are the cited author’s Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) Index. For our study, we ﬁnd the
PREG indexes more appealing than Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), the alternative mea-
sure often used in macroeconomic studies, because they provide a more careful identiﬁcation of
politically-relevant ethnic groups in each country. Youth literacy rates are those of the year 1990
and were extracted from the World Bank’s 2005 World Development Indicators. Poverty data are
collected from the World Development Report 2000/2001 (World Bank 2000). The Gini Indexes
are collected from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s 2007/2008 Human De-
velopment Report.
A country or territory’s Corruption Perception Index score, as deﬁned by Transparency In-
ternational, indicates “the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by business people and
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).” We use the year
2007 scores. A reader of our study may object that the level of state corruption as perceived in
2007 is possibly very different from what that level may have been in the 1980’s.15 Indeed, the
nations of the world, and Africa in particular, have experienced substantial political change in the
intervening 20 years. For instance, multiparty systems have appeared as a new political regime in
many SSA countries.
There are at least two justiﬁcations for our use of 2007 corruption measures. One is that the
2007 measures provide an approximation of the conditions that prevailed two decades ago. A cru-
cial empirical question is whether the observed evolution of political institutions during the last two
decades has substantially changed the quality of governance in SSA. Studies of that question do
not agree on an answer. For example, Alence (2004) found that “a combination of democratic con-
testation and institutional restraints on governments’ discretionary authority substantially improves
developmental governance.” However, M´ edard (2002) concluded, “Democratization, including the
countries where it had some success, did not have the expected effect on corruption.” Moreover,
this last author also argued that evaluations at the time he wrote all suggested an increase of cor-
ruption. More important in our view is the overall stability from year to year in the corruption
rankings provided by Transparency International and the World Bank, even while the positions
of some countries vary somewhat from one index to another (Rose-Ackerman 2004). We use the
2007 corruption-ranking scores, therefore, as a proxy for the governing authorities’ abuse of polit-
ical power to obtain private beneﬁts while placing the burdensome results of their behaviors on a
country’s population.
Our second justiﬁcation for use of a later-dated corruption-perception measure as a gauge
alongside our tracking of past behavior draws upon economic reasoning. If we assume that ado-
lescent girls and their parents more or less accurately perceive a link between corruption, state
failure and their own daily struggles, then the failed state in which they expect to live in the future
may also motivate, at least in part, their behaviors today. If they expect state failure to be worse
in the future, then young girls face alternative decisions that can be described as follows. They
can secure as soon as possible a viable economic position for themselves and their parents and
future children. Or else they can wait for an illusive dream of the better life to come. Facing these
15Transparency International has in fact published data on corruption since 1995 but not for all countries. We chose
the year 2007 in order to have data on most SSA countries.
8present alternatives, a young woman today is likely to accept - or her parents are likely to pressure
her to accept - a marriage proposition or intimate dating relationship with a wealthier man. In this
transaction, using future (one generation ahead) corruption measures to understand current sexual
behaviors makes economic sense.16
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of several variables, which highlight the cross coun-
try variations observed in SSA. The last column contains the coefﬁcients of variation, i.e., the
standard-deviation to mean ratio. Note that the age-gap between men and women within married
couples, the CPI’s and the world corruption rank, all have similar coefﬁcients of variation. Across
SSA countries, there is a higher variation in the percentage of girls married before age 15 and
the percentage of youth engaged in sexual encounters before age 15. Ethnic fractionalization also
varies substantially across the studied countries. In contrast, the average age at ﬁrst sexual en-
counter varies much less than the corruption variables for both men and women. However, there
is a sharp increase in variation for women relative to men. The Gini Index varies less than the
Corruption Perception Index. Poverty has a same level of variation as male youth literacy and
the latter is considerably less than the variation in female youth literacy. The variation in GDP is
considerable. This is due to the inclusion of very small countries such as Sao Tome and Principe
in the computation of the mean and the standard error. These small countries do not enter the
coming estimations due to missing variables.17 The table also shows that there is more variation
across countries in female youth literacy than male youth literacy. Overall the variables displayed
in Table 1 present non-negligible variation that we examine more closely in the next section.
4 Results
4.1 Estimation Results
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are for each dependent variable, distinguished according to
whether we performed OLS regression or IV regression. The IV regression was needed to correct
for a possible endogeneity bias, which could be caused, for example, by the use of female youth
literacy as a predictor of early marriage. We use male youth literacy rate as the instrument for
female youth literacy rate. To ease the reference to particular regressions results, the results have
been numbered from 1 to 12 in the ﬁrst columns of Tables 2 and 3. The second columns contains
the sample sizes, which are excessively small, due to the limited number of countries and the high
prevalence of missing data. This fact led us to choose a restrictive notion of signiﬁcance to describe
the effects of the different regressors. To this end, we provide four different tail-probability values
(p-values). These are based on 4 different evaluations of the variance-covariance matrices of the
regression coefﬁcients: the large-sample normality approximation, the bootstrap estimator, the
Jackknife estimator, and Hubert-White’s (sandwich) estimator. They are denoted by Info.Mat. (for
Information matrix), Bootstr. (for Bootstrap), Jack. (for Jackknife), and Robust (for the sandwich
16This remark can be made also for the Gini Indexes. Along with political conditions, it is also possible that
marriage and premarital sexual behavior has evolved since the 1980’s in SSA. Mensh et al. (2005) discuss some
observable changes from 1994 to 2003.
17In fact, GDP does not enter none of the coming regressions. It is provided here as an additional aspect of cross-
country variations.
9estimator). Statistical signiﬁcance at the levels 10 % and 5 % is indicated respectively by one
and two stars. According to our conservative reading of the results, we considered the effect of
a variable to be strongly signiﬁcant only if it is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 % (respectively, at 5
% or 10 % ) according to all the 4 different p-values. Likewise, the effect of a variable is judged
signiﬁcant only if it is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 % or 10 % according to all the 4 different p-
values. In all the other cases, the effect is considered insigniﬁcant.
Note that a lower CPI for a country means that the country is more corrupt. A higher value
for ethnic fractionalization signals potential political rivalry where the ethnic factor plays a more
important role.
After we control for corruption, politically-relevant ethnic diversity, and youth literacy, the
somewhat surprising result is that poverty and inequality do not appear to signiﬁcantly affect the
YRH. This is the case in all regressions except 1 and 2 where these variables have a clear effect
on female median age at marriage. In these ﬁrst 2 regressions, higher poverty, higher perception
of corruption, lower female literacy and higher prospect of ethnic rivalry are all associated with
lower age at marriage for women. The direction of the effect of the Gini Index is unexpected,
however, because higher inequality is associated with greater age at marriage. Results 3 and 4
reveal that it is youth literacy, not poverty and inequality, that best accounts for the variation in the
age-gap at marriage. Higher female youth literacy is associated with lower age-gap at marriage.
The variation in female youth literacy also accounts for the variation in early marriage (Regression
5 and 6). Female youth literacy is negatively associated with the percentage of women who marry
before the age of 15 years.18 It is worth noting that in the presence of female youth literacy and
ethnic fractionalization, poverty and inequality, as well as corruption, have insigniﬁcant effects
on the frequency of early marriage. Literacy and ethnic fractionalization have strongly signiﬁcant
and opposite effects on the age at ﬁrst sexual intercourse (Regressions 7 and 8) for women (Re-
gressions 5 and 6). Results 9 and 10 show that ethnic fractionalization and corruption have strong
positive effects on the proportion of women who engage in sexual encounter before the age of 15
years, while this proportion decreases with female youth literacy. In sharp contrast, a male youth’s
sexuality seems not to be specially affected by any of the considered factors (Regressions 11 and
12).
Overall, we ﬁnd that after controlling for poverty and inequality, the variations in corruption,
ethnicfractionalizationandyouthliteracyappeartoexplainasubstantialproportionoftheobserved
variations in youth reproductive health. While poverty has been judged central to health and in
particular to reproductive health, one must note that this is the case only when other factors that
may generate or exacerbate (or are fueled by) poverty are not taken into account. We believe that
our ﬁnding is important for the nuance that it introduces in a poverty-centered view of YRH. In our
view, the policy implication of foremost importance from the above ﬁndings is that education, in
particular health literacy, is a powerful weapon against the greatest risks to YRH. While schooling
girls is a socially and economically sound alternative to early marriage, it must be stressed that
states bear the responsibility of offering this alternative to poor parents through public school.
18Note that we ﬁnd a strongly signiﬁcant effect of ethnic diversity on the percentage of girls who marry before
the age of 15 years, when we measure ethnic diversity by the usual ELF Index instead. This is discussed below in
the robustness check based on the use of alternative indexes (Section 4.2). This suggests that the prevalence of rival
social norms within the context of ethnic-based political tension is an important factor to consider in programs aimed
at reducing early marriage.
10But, corrupt states, as seen above, tend both to reduce government spending on education and to
promote among the youth the irrelevance of education as a worthwhile road to achievement. We
therefore believe that, like poverty, corruption must be addressed as a public health issue.
4.2 Robustness Check: Using Alternative Indexes of Poverty, Corruption
and Ethnic Fractionalization
There are alternative measures of poverty, inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and corruption in
the literature. For example, the threshold of $2 per day (moderate poverty), which underlies the
index that we used in the above estimations, could be set to $1 per day instead (extreme poverty).
Poverty can also be measured by percentages of the population living below national, country-
speciﬁc poverty lines. As noted in Section 3, ethnic fractionalization is more often measured in the
literature by the ELF Index. The World Bank publishes six measures of governance. Among these,
the Control of Corruption is conceptually the closest to the CPI that we use for this project.19 To
gauge the effects of these alternative measures on our results, we performed different sets of com-
parative estimations as follows. We used two alternative indexes of poverty (Below-$1-per-day
and Below-National-Poverty-Line). Also, As an alternative for the measure of ethnic fractional-
ization, we substituted the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) for our original variable
(ETHNIC). For corruption, we substituted the World Bank Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for
the variable Corruption Perception Index.20
These alternative measures did not produce substantial changes in the signiﬁcance patterns
forthesethreeinﬂuencesonYouthReproductiveHealth, exceptwhenweusedtheBelow-National-
Poverty-Line Index as our measure of poverty. In that case, we no longer obtained the signiﬁcance
of the poverty variable identiﬁed in Table 2, Regressions 1 and 2. However, this departure from the
earlier results was not a surprise, because the Below-National-Poverty-Line Index is not directly
comparable across countries. By contrast, we noted with great interest, the impact of the change
in the measure of ethnic inﬂuence. As noted in the footnote on Page 10, substitution of the usual
ELF Index for Posner’s Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups (PREG) led us to conclude that ethnic
diversity has a strong and signiﬁcant effect on early marriage. On the other hand, substituting
the World Bank’s CCI for Transparency International’s CPI did not change our results. Overall,
we found that the results described above were robust in relation to the alternative measures we
considered.
5 Policy Implications
The above development has stressed a link between YRH, youth unemployment, governance and
local cultural factors in SSA. Regarding governance, the empirical exercise that we performed
19According to the explanation provided on the World Bank’s website, the Control of Corruption index “measures
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as ’capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.”
20The sample correlation coefﬁcients between the new and the old indexes are 92.47 (for CPI and CC), 69.93 (for
ETHNIC and ELF), 87.84 (for the previous variable POVERTY and the Below-$1-per-day), 30.18 (for POVERTY and
the Below-National-Poverty-Line), and 42.70 (for the Below-$1-per-day and the Below-National-Poverty-Line)
11suggests that YRH is worse in countries with worse governance as measure here by the CPI. This
ﬁnding suggest in particular that bad governance is in good place among the challenges facing
the youth in SSA. It also invites reﬂections over the best ways to accompany and substantiate the
invitation addressed to the youth by African states to actively participate in policy decisions. In-
deed, Article 12 of the AYC urges every State Parties to “develop a comprehensive and coherent
national youth policy.” The point b of the Article is even more promising because it stipulates
that “The development of a national youth policy shall be informed by extensive consultation with
young people and cater for their active participation in decision-making at all levels of governance
in issues concerning youth and society as a whole.” One should rightfully be cautious about the
effectiveness of this openness since Charter speciﬁcally adds the provision that this policy will be
conducted, in accordance with states constitutional processes. While this provision seems to be a
normal one in any modern state, it is worth noting that country-speciﬁc laws on youth have not al-
ways been compatible with and have in some places contradicted the requirements of international
agreements, in particular in the domain of youth reproductive health. Examples of such inconsis-
tencies leading to the violation of the International Human Rights of Adolescents, in particular in
the domain of reproductive health, are documented in the literature (CRLP & CLF 2002).21
The concerns raised by the above development can be summarized in two questions: (i)
What regulatory instruments are more likely to ensure properly integrated management of youth
policies? (ii) What government instruments would ensure that resources for youth employment
and YRH are not redirected to other uses? While these questions can only receive country-speciﬁc
answers, it is a profound belief of the author that a coordination of the efforts deployed by NGO’s,
donors, policy-oriented research organizations, as well as the civil societies in SSA, can contribute
to better understand and design the intervention and control mechanisms that can best help SSA
countries to achieve the goals stated in the AYC and the declaration of the African Youth Decade.
6 Conclusion
The recent AYC and the declaration of 2009-2019, the Decade on Youth Development, combined
with the call of the World Bank on African countries to adopt youth-employment enhancing pol-
icy strategies, suggest that Africa might be at the dawn of a new era of leadership. An empirical
investigation of the relationship between YRH and governance in SSA suggests, however, that bad
governance is part of the burden faced by the youth in Africa, in particular in the domain of YRH.
The endemic prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases in SSA, in particular AIDS/HIV, has gen-
erated considerable attention on youth sexual behavior for its serious public health consequences.
This paper has examined the extent to which available data can shed light on the determinants of
YRH in SSA. While poverty and inequality may appear as obvious threats to YRH, our study sug-
gests that one should not overlook other less visible factors, which may work in a dark alliance with
poverty and inequality to compromise the reproductive health of adolescents in SSA. Widespread
government corruption, which corrupts a nation’s social and economic structures, and ethnic di-
21Even international organizations such as the World Banks may and have sometimes hesitated in their ﬁrm engage-
ment to support reproductive health programs (Sippel 2007). Further, as a recent internal World Bank Report found,
they may also fail to effectively address fraud and corruption in the very mission that they pursue (G.A.P 2009).
12versity are two such factors. Because it impoverishes the quality of public education and reduces
its perceived economic value among youth, the endemic prevalence of corruption entices young
people to pursue their future well-being in the embrace of unhealthy relationships. For young and
poor women, this may mean recourse to “Sugar Daddy” and other inappropriate relationships of
sexual intimacy. Our ﬁndings suggest that early sexual debut is strongly related to corruption.
We also ﬁnd a strong effect of ethnic diversity, which suggests that it can have policy-
mediated effects on YHR. Local norms can indeed hinder national programs of YRH if these
norms come to be associated with ethnic values in political contexts where different ethnic groups
are in (real or artiﬁcially generated) rivalry. However, on a positive note, we also ﬁnd that youth
literacy can provide powerful protection for YRH. To be more effective in enhancing YRH, literacy
programsshouldprovideappropriatesub-programsofsexualeducation, especiallyinthiseraofen-
demic prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Indeed, the ﬁnding that an alarming proportion of sexually-active
SSA adolescents do not know of any source from which to obtain contraception or treatment for
sexually transmitted infections (Biddlecom et al. 2007) should inspire more attention to the health
goals of youth literacy programs.
The new era of hope for the African youth will not bring the expected positive changes,
unless it also becomes, beyond mere international commitments, an era of accountability and per-
formance of African states in their mission of designing and implementing appropriate policies.
More than ever, it is necessary to substantiate the good intentions expressed by African leaders and
international institutions with a strong request of accountability. For this to be effective, this paper
calls for an active involvement in the transformation process, of civil societies in Africa, NGO’s,
donors, as well as policy-oriented research institutions within and outside of Africa.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Countries Included in the Study
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African, Chad,
Comoros Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic, Congo, Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equa-
torial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho,
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nige-
ria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
7.2 Tables
17Table 1: Summary Statistics.
Variable Symbol Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Coef. Var.
Female Median Age at Marriage WAM 44 21.077 2.687513 16.6 27.1 .1275076
Age-gap between Men
and Momen at Marriage AGE GAP 40 5.485 1.81695 1.8 9.2 .331258
Percentage of women
ever Married Before Age 15 Marr 15 44 29.052 17.18702 4.5 74.2 .5915896
Ethnic Fractionalization ETHNIC 42 0.38976 0.2467594 0 0.8 .6331028
Median Age at First
Sexual Encounter for Men FSI M 24 18.542 1.197068 16.5 20.5 .064561
Percentage of Men who Had
Sexual Encounter Before Age 15 SEX 15 M 20 9.44 6.557952 2.5 26 .6946983
Median Age at First
Sexual Encounter for Women FSI W 27 17.037 1.895977 15.5 24 .1112856
Percentage of Women who had
Sexual Encounter Before Age 15 SEX 15 W 25 22.332 11.0547 3 46.6 .4950162
Male Youth Literacy Rate in 1990 YLR M 90 31 72.129 18.62389 25 97 .2582025
Female Youth Literacy Rate in 1990 YLR W 90 30 57.4 26.09082 9 91 .454544
Gini Index of Inequality GINI 31 47.20968 9.68316 30 74.3 .2051096
GDP in Thousands US$ GDP 45 15239.93 37475.03 133.0301 246794.6 2.459003
Corruption Perception Index in 2007 CPI 48 2.806 0.9288305 1.4 5.4 .3309864
World Corruption Rank RANK 48 119.125 38.07363 38 179 .3196107
Poverty POVERTY 30 70.38667 18.22962 22.5 96.6 .2589926
18Table 2: Regression Results.
DEPENDENT=WAM
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Info.Mat Bootstr. Jack. Robust
POVERTY -0.0397153 0.018** 0.021** 0.013** 0.008** 0.8708 0.8304
GINI 0.0636161 0.099* 0.102 0.116 0.049**
1 22 OLS CPI 0.8828397 0.026** 0.057* 0.041** 0.009**
YLR W 0.0503877 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
ETHNIC -3.146991 0.026** 0.031** 0.022** 0.009**
CONST 16.64474 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
POVERTY -0.0421177 0.001** 0.028** 0.005** 0.000** 0.8686
GINI 0.069349 0.027** 0.085* 0.083* 0.006**
2 22 IV CPI 0.9102961 0.003** 0.040** 0.027** 0.000**
YLR W 0.0440039 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
ETHNIC -2.896402 0.009** 0.059* 0.026** 0.001**
CONST 16.72043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEPENDENT=AGE-GAP
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Info.Mat Bootstr. Jack. Robust
POVERTY -0.0027438 0.884 0.897 0.902 0.874 0.5307 0.3502
GINI -0.094993 0.115 0.171 0.068* 0.028**
3 19 OLS CPI -0.1799369 0.687 0.764 0.756 0.613
YLR W -0.0315256 0.064* 0.038** 0.034** 0.012**
ETHNIC -0.1322465 0.936 0.951 0.954 0.934
CONST 12.36048 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.000
POVERTY -0.0038246 0.804 0.829 0.857 0.777 0.5297
GINI -0.0924078 0.048** 0.150 0.073* 0.003**
4 19 IV CPI -0.1669467 0.645 0.824 0.775 0.561
YLR W -0.0341634 0.012** 0.031** 0.015** 0.000**
ETHNIC -0.0179295 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.988
CONST 12.37896 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000
DEPENDENT=MARR 15
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Info.Mat Bootstr. Jack. Robust
POVERTY 0.1043364 0.445 0.448 0.577 0.473 0.6931 0.5972
GINI 0.0766422 0.815 0.855 0.817 0.75
5 22 OLS CPI -2.091448 0.523 0.711 0.565 0.413
YLR W -0.4596795 0.001** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
ETHNIC 26.26435 0.035** 0.129 0.092* 0.030**
CONST 39.79305 0.049** 0.041** 0.126 0.038**
POVERTY 0.1111861 0.331 0.539 0.536 0.340 0.6926
GINI 0.0602972 0.828 0.860 0.857 0.768
6 22 IV CPI -2.169729 0.428 0.643 0.537 0.294
YLR W -0.4414787 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 0.000**
ETHNIC 25.54989 0.009** 0.131 0.088* 0.004**
CONST 39.57725 0.013 0.158 0.114 0.007
19Table 3: Regression Results. Cont.
DEPENDENT=FSI W
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Info.Mat Bootstr. Jack. Robust
POVERTY 0.0074402 0.630 0.486 0.469 0.410 0.5814 0.4319
GINI -0.0128305 0.652 0.664 0.747 0.658
7 20 OLS CPI 0.5010063 0.163 0.133 0.177 0.078*
YLR W 0.0419666 0.003** 0.018** 0.02** 0.008**
ETHNIC -5.056843 0.006** 0.023** 0.031** 0.015**
CONST 15.43679 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
POVERTY 0.0070951 0.576 0.719 0.475 0.318 0.5785
GINI -0.0109804 0.639 0.775 0.778 0.628
8 20 IV CPI 0.5138277 0.072* 0.246 0.176 0.022**
YLR W 0.0383344 0.000** 0.053* 0.059* 0.001**
ETHNIC -4.76153 0.000** 0.077* 0.060* 0.002**
CONST 15.40593 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEPENDENT=SEX 15 W
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Info.Mat Bootstr. Jack. Robust
POVERTY 0.0989984 0.276 0.301 0.226 0.190 0.836 0.7729
GINI 0.2586084 0.116 0.268 0.088* 0.034**
9 19 OLS CPI -7.352507 0.005** 0.005** 0.001** 0.000**
YLR W -0.3969475 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
ETHNIC 51.09224 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
CONST 21.60227 0.081 0.204 0.045 0.026
POVERTY 0.098672 0.171 0.180 0.228 0.095* 0.8359
GINI 0.2603869 0.041** 0.231 0.086* 0.005**
10 19 IV CPI -7.340429 0.000** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000**
YLR W -0.4004437 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
ETHNIC 51.37635 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
CONST 21.573 0.022 0.141 0.045 0.003
DEPENDENT=FSI M
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Inform. Mat Bootstr. Jack Robust
POVERTY .0078278 0.689 0.736 0.724 0.695 0.3007 0.0510
GINI -.0105382 0.743 0.796 0.734 0.630
11 20 OLS CPI .531657 0.288 0.406 0.311 0.207
YLR W -.0247073 0.172 0.252 0.313 0.156
ETHNIC -.4890094 0.792 0.861 0.841 0.803
CONST 19.03033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEPENDENT=SEX 15 M
p-value R2 Adj.R2
No Obs Reg. Type Expl. Coef. Inform. Mat Bootstr. Jack Robust
POVERTY -.0046872 0.967 0.977 0.971 0.966 0.2367 -0.0813
GINI -.0019177 0.993 0.994 0.993 0.991
12 18 OLS CPI -2.519848 0.473 0.716 0.557 0.459
YLR W .0873302 0.405 0.532 0.487 0.352
ETHNIC 7.580337 0.510 0.560 0.546 0.468
CONST 7.359306 0.629 0.763 0.643 0.598
20